Evolutionary dynamics provides an iconic relationship -the periodic frequencies of a game is determined by the payoff-matrix of the game. This letter reports the first experimental evidence to confirm such a relationship in two populations random-matched 2 × 2 games with 12 different payoffmatrix parameters.
Introduction
Cycle is a significant phenomenon in social evolution. Evolutionary game theory predicts cyclic behavior as well, but such behavior has rarely been confirmed clearly in experimental games [13, 7, 11] .
Only quite recently, in a continuous time laboratory environment, Cason, Friedman and Hopkins (CFH, 2012 [7] ) found clear persistent cycles in population state space with the method of cycle rotation indexes (CRI). After that, with the CRI method, we found that in a traditional setting Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, cycles also exist, persist and do not dissipate [24] . For all of the cycles detected in experiments, the directions of cycles meet evolutional dynamics very well. Therefore one can say, qualitatively, cycles in experiments conform to the expectations of evolutional dynamics.
Some interesting questions now appear. How the cycles change when the parameters of game is changed? Can cycles meet evolutionary dynamics quantitatively?
To answer these questions, we recur to periodic frequency -an iconic observable in cyclic behaviors. Our motivation comes from both experimental economics and the evolutionary game theory. On one hand, the frequency of the cycles in experiment can be measured. On the other hand, the frequencies can be calculated with the dynamics equations. Then, the consistency of the two sides can be tested.
Base on the 12 experiments of 2×2 games 2 , we detect and confirm the existence, persistence of the cycles whose directions meet evolutionary dynamics. Meanwhile, each game has its own frequency in the experiment due to its unique payoff matrix. Firstly, we find the empirical cyclic frequencies relates linearly to the theoretical frequencies significantly. The theoretical frequencies are calculated explicitly from the payoff-normalized replicator dynamics 3 (PNRD) [12] . The structure of this letter is as follow. In next section, we introduce the 12 games briefly, calculate the theoretical frequencies for each of the 12 games from the PNRD equations and point out the testable hypothesis. In section 3, we test the hypothesis and report the results (1) the cycles do exist and persist in the 12 games; (2) there exists a positive correlation between the theoretical frequencies and the experimental frequencies; (3) the average radius of the cycles do not change along time as expected by PNRD. The last section includes discussion and summary. Mathematical and statistical appendixes comes at the end.
Experiments, Eigenvalues and Testable Hypothesis

The 12 two population 2 × 2 games
We use the 12 experiments with a variety of parameters in an influential published literature Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2-Games by Selten and Chmura [16] .
All the 12 experiments are of the traditional setting which has been widely used to investigate dynamical behaviors [9, 8, 13, 16, 2] . Specifically, There are two four-person populations in each group of the games [16] . Each group play the game for 200 rounds. The strategy set for each player in the first population X is (X 1 ,X 2 ) and the second population Y is (Y 1 ,Y 2 ). In each round, every subject plays the game against a opponent randomly picked from the other population. The payoff matrix for each game can be generalized as Fig. 1 where a ij (b ij ), i, j = 1, 2 indicates the payoff for the players in the first (second) population. The game 1∼6 (each consists of 12 groups) are constant sum games and the game 7∼12 (each contains of 6 groups) are nonconstant sum games having the same Nash equilibriums with the game 1∼6 correspondingly.
The advantage of such experimental settings can be elaborated as follows. (1) As emphasized by the original designers of the experiments, for all the game, (2) The 12 games each has a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, all belong to the most fundamental classical evolutionary dynamics models whose real part of the eigenvalues are 0 and endless cycles are expected mathematically which we should show in section 2. parameters setting and the largest in the involved subjects number. With these advantages, these 12 games are supposed to be representative and fit for our investigations for social dynamics.
Theoretical frequencies of the 12 games
An evolutionary dynamics model describes the dynamics properties of a system. To obtain a theoretical expectation of the frequency, we start from PNRD [12] -an almost the oldest and the simplest model in evolutionary game theory. If a social state is supposed to be at (x, y) in which x denotes the proportion of X 1 strategy used in the population X and y denotes the proportion of Y 1 strategy used in the population Y . The velocity at (x, y), denoted as (ẋ,ẏ) [18, 21, 3, 17] , can be expressed for PNRD [12] as,
in whichŪ X (Ū Y ) is the mean payoff of the population X (Y ) and U X 1 (U Y 1 ) is the payoff for the individual who uses the X 1 (Y 1 ) strategy in the population X (Y ). According to the 2×2 payoff matrix in Fig. 1 , the inner equilibrium N point, denoted as (x N , y N ), can be obtained; Then around N, we can get the square of eigenvalues λ expressed (see Appendix A.1 and Table 1) as
Substituting each of the payoff matrix of the 12 games into Eq. (3), we find all the λ 2 are negative. Denoting the eigenvalues as λ = α ± iβ, we have λ has only pure imaginary part (β) and the real part (α) is zero 5 . Base on β, the theoretical periodic frequency (f theo ) of a game can be calculated as
The f theo are shown in Table 1 and will serve as the approximate 6 theoretical expectations in Fig. 3 to compare with observed frequencies.
Testable Hypothesis
In stochastic adaptive dynamics processes, as emphasized by Young [26] , in the detailed balance condition, the transitions between any pair of the two states is symmetry. In this condition, no net transit could be found in the state space. On the contrary, if there exists asymmetry transits within states, the detailed balance symmetry is broken, then pattern of the net transit must emerge in the state space [22, 1, 19, 23] . For cyclic games, a naive hypothesis is the net cycles can be captured by the evolutionary dynamics quantitatively.
By counting the net cycles in experimental time sequences, in the 200 rounds/session and 108 session and 12 games data, the theoretical predictions of the PNRD fall into following testable hypothesis.
(1) The social state will move cyclically; Directions of the cycles are clockwise.
(2) The experimental frequency (f exp ) of the cycles is linear correlative to the theoretical frequency (f theo ). f exp should be 0 when f theo is zero.
(3) The the average radius of the cycles R should not change along time. 
Hypothesis Tests
Test method: trajectory, Poincare section and net cycles
As mentioned, we use social state (x, y) to describes the aggregate behavior in these games [14] . As illustrated in Fig. 2 , there are altogether 25 social states in a two-population society where each population contains of four persons in the games. For a certain round t, the social state must be one of the 25 points in Fig 2. Across rounds, the state (x, y) is supposed to keep transiting and form a stochastic-like trajectory [14, 7] .
To verify the cycles qualitatively, we recur to the CRI (Cycle Rotation Index) method [7] . To calculate CRI, a segment (called as Poincare section [7] , denoted as S, as shown in Fig. 2 ) is set from Nash Equilibrium N of the game to the low edge of its own state space. Every transit-i across S can be denoted as C i and be assigned as C i =1 (-1) if the transit is counterclockwise (clockwise). Then the CRI denoted by θ can be calculated as
in which i C i is the net cycles (denoted as C e t 0 ,t 1
) and i |C i | is the total transits across the Poincare section-S. The θ indicate the existence of cycles when it does not equals to 0. Additionally, θ > 0 (θ < 0) indicates the direction of cycles is counterclockwise (clockwise) 7 . We use the subscript (t 0 , t 1 ) to denote the observation in time interval [t 0 , t 1 ], like θ t 0 ,t 1 .
Existence, persistence and direction of the cycles
To test the existence of the net cycles in the 12 games, we calculate the average valueθ 1, 200 for the 12 games as well as the standard error over the groups. The results are shown in Table 2 . Using the 12 games as samples, we find the existence of cycles is significant (p<0.000, d.f.=11, two tailed, t-test with H 0 : θ 1,200 = 0). Table 2 ). This consists the PNRD predictions (as shown in Appendix A.2).
Experimental frequency vs theoretical frequency
The experimental periodic frequency can be imaged as the time average cycles counted. Similar to Eq. (5) and references [1, 7, 23] , we defined
7 If we denote C + = Ci=1 |C i | ( C − = Ci=−1 |C i |) to present the counterclockwise (or clockwise) transits' times. The index θ is (C + − C − )/(C + + C − ) as CRI [7] . Table 2 .
The relationship between the theoretical frequencies (f theo ) and experimental frequencies (f exp ) of the 12 games is demonstrated in Fig. 3 . This is the main result of this letter.
Statistical results show that the coefficient of the linear regression over the 12 paired samples is 0.498±0.057. It indicates the positive correlation between theoretical frequencies and experimental frequencies is strongly significant (at 8.7σ > 5σ level 8 ). In addition, the constant of the regression is 0.002±0.003 (p=0.799, twotailed) and its 95%C.I. [-0.005 0.009] includes 0.000. This implicates no systematic deviation exist -f exp should be zero when f theo is zero.
Results from the robustness testings replicate the relationships above (at σ>5 level when the center of the Poincare section set at the game mean or at the group mean. For more details, see Appendix A.3 and Table A .3.).
Radius of the net cycles
Whenever a transit-i crosses the Poincare section, the Euclidean distance (denoted as x i ) of the crossing dot to the center N can be measured (see examples in Fig. 2 and Appendix A.4). Explicitly, for a given time interval [t 0 , t 1 ], the average radius of the cycles 9 can be defined as The robustness of this result is evaluated by changing the Poincare section 10 , results from the 12 games samples report also the radius are of time independence. As expected by the PNRD, these 12 variety parameters 2×2 games are neutral (α = 0) instead of stable (α < 0, spiral in) or unstable (α > 0, spiral out).
Till now, each of the three hypothesis in section 2.3 gains its supports from the data.
Discussion
In the 12 diverse 2×2 population games, we confirm the existence of the net cycles. The observed periodic frequencies of cycles are different in the 12 games. Interesting, the experimental frequencies linear positive relates to the theoretical frequencies which are calculated explicitly from PNRD, significantly (> 5σ). Robustness testing supports the results.
Related works and notes
The eigenvalues (λ = α + iβ) in evolutionary dynamics have been used to bridge the experimental social behaviors and evolutionary game theory [11, 6, 7] . The periodic frequencies (related to β) has also been discussed by CHF [7] . In the 12 games investigated in this letter, the imaginary parts β serves as the controlled variable and α(=0) serves as the invariant variable, the testing for the periodic property is possible.
On methodology view, these findings are benefitted from recently effort on experimental testing on evolutionary dynamics -transition spectrum method [25] , the CRI [7] , the angular momentum method [20] and the velocity field method [22] . Common point of these metrics is to capture the net transits who are of time asymmetry. In this letter, we mainly use the Poincare section method [7] . For the net cycle counting, Poincare section methos is an approximation. The results of the cycles counting could be affected by where the Poincare sections are set. In more general conditions, how to test the dynamics behavior more efficiently might be a question.
On observable view, as a novel experimental observable, periodic frequency can serve also as a testable variable for social dynamics behavior testing. This observable, which can be both theoretically calculated and experimentally measured, could be a link between evolutionary game theory and experiments.
Puzzles on the evolutionary dynamics models
In the tens and still growing-up numbers of the evolutionary dynamics models [21, 10, 14] , to capture the experimental frequencies, we firstly use PNRD -an almost the oldest and the simplest model. Mainly, we consider two aspects following. (1) Replicator dynamics is the simplest model. (2) The payoff values in the dynamics equations need to be normalized, because the time has been normalized by experimental discrete time rounds. Even though the significance of their linear relationship is up to 5σ and the constant of the regression closes 0, however, the theoretical frequencies from PNRD is twice as much as the experimental frequencies. This is a crucial puzzle 11 . Admittedly, we are not aware now which dynamics will perform better than PNRD among the tens dynamics models [21, 14] or the learning models [5] . Nevertheless, the results in Fig. 3 provide a hind that evolutionary game theory can be expected be tested in laboratory experiments.
Summary
Using the 12 different parameters 2×2 games, besides confirm the observations of the cycles in experimental games [7] , we are interested to find the experimental periodic frequencies of the cycles are positively relative to the theoretical periodic frequencies significant (>5σ level). The theoretical periodic frequencies are calculated from the payoff-normalized replicator dynamics -an almost the oldest and the simplest model.
Appendix A.
Appendix A.1. A Mathematical derivation for the eigenvalues
To give a mathematical derivation of the eigenvalues, we start from the PNRD equation. The equations are specified by the 2×2 payoff matrix as Table 1 . Symbols in this section are elaborated in reference [15] .
Suppose x (y) is the proportion of the first population using strategy X 1 (Y 1 ), it is natural that X 2 =1 − X 1 and Y 2 =1 − Y 1 . Then the average payoff for the four strategies can be expressed as the following matrix.
where U X i (U Y i ), i = 1, 2 is the payoff for a player in the first population choosing strategy X i (Y i ). Further, the average payoff for each population can be aggregated as,
According to the payoff-normalized replicator dynamics (PNRD) equation [12] , we obtain the a system of ordinary differential equations (ODE)
Specified for 2×2 games whose payoff matrix are shown as Fig. 1 , the ODE above can be presented aṡ
Apparently, there exists a unique inner Nash equilibrium N in the rectangular coordinate system constructed by x and y (0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1), which is 
.
Then, the square of the eigenvalues of Jacobian is
which is the Eq.(3) in main text. Substituting the payoff matrices of the 12 games into Eq.(3) in main text, we find that their eigenvalues squared are all negative real numbers as λ 2 column in Table 1 . Denoting λ as α + iβ, one can notice that, the real part of the eigenvalue α equals 0 and only the imaginary part left.
This means the eigenvalues of the 12 games are the pure imaginary values, even though the values differ for each of the 12 games. Then, the theoretical periodic frequencies in Eq.(4) should be different for the 12 games.
Appendix A.2. Theoretical directions of the cycles
We use PNRD equations to demonstrate the directions of the cycles of the 12 games respectively. All of the velocity vector fields are cyclic and clockwise as shown in Fig. A.4 . 
